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Expanding the Boundaries of
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International Law and Critical
Geography at the Crossroads
Michal Saliternik*
ABSTRACT
This Article identifies a new trend in the adjudication of
international boundary disputes and examines it from a
historical and normative perspective. For many years, the
resolution of international land boundary disputes was governed
exclusively by the principle of the stability and continuity of
boundaries. Under this paradigm, the main role of international
adjudicators was to determine the exact location of historical
boundary lines that had been set forth in colonial-era treaties or
decrees. Once these lines were ascertained, they were strictly
enforced, and any attempt to challenge them was dismissed.
In recent years, however, international adjudicators have
been increasingly inclined to deviate from historical boundaries
in order to promote "human-oriented"goals such as the protection
of borderland populations or the bolstering of peace efforts. After
demonstrating this development in several cases, the Article
evaluates its normative implications. For that purpose, the
Article turns to Critical Border Studies (CBS), an emerging field
within political geography that critically explores the sources,
functions, and effects of borders. CBS sheds light on the power
asymmetries that underlie the traditional paradigm and points
to the need to adopt a more dynamic and equitable approach to
boundary delineation.
Drawing on CBS insights, as well as on recent boundary
jurisprudence, the Article maps out several types of human-
oriented considerations that international adjudicators should
take into account when deciding boundary disputes and
examines ways to balance them with the principle of the stability
of boundaries. Beyond its contribution to the study and
development of international boundary law, this Article
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demonstrates the broader potential of marrying international
law with critical geography, which has, so far, mostly been
overlooked.
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EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF BOUNDARY DISPUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Land boundary disputes have occupied a central place in
international adjudication for more than a century now.1 During most
of this time, the resolution of such disputes was governed exclusively
by the principle of the stability and continuity of boundaries.2 This
principle entailed that, once a boundary had been determined, whether
by existing states or their predecessors, it was almost impossible to
challenge or revise without the consent of all the bordering states.3
Under this approach, international judges and arbitrators upheld
boundary treaties regardless of apparent defects in the original
commitment or other fundamental challenges to their validity.4
Moreover, even though most of these treaties had been concluded
between former colonial powers with little knowledge of, or concern for
local geographic and demographic conditions, any request for even a
minor adaptation of the boundary based on such factors was dismissed
outright.5 The principle of the stability and continuity of boundaries
also manifested itself in the strict application of the uti possidetis
doctrine, which entailed that, in the case of a dissolution of a single
colonial empire (or a federal republic) into several independent states,
the internal administrative boundaries of the former were maintained
as the international boundaries of the latter.6 The main purpose of this
zealous adherence to historical boundaries was to reduce territorial
conflicts between neighboring states.7 The prevailing assumption was
that any change in the territorial status quo might harm the
1. Maritime boundary disputes have also been central to international
adjudication during this period. While some of the issues discussed here may also be of
relevance to maritime boundary disputes, a direct analysis of such cases falls beyond the
scope of this Article.
2. The principle of the stability and continuity of boundaries and the central
role that it played in traditional boundary dispute settlement are discussed in several
studies. See, e.g., A.O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967); Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Some Observations on the Doctrine
of Continuity and Finality of Boundaries, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 119 (1984); Itamar
Bernstein, Delimitation of International Boundaries: A Study of Modern Practice and
Devices from the Viewpoint of International Law (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Geneva) (on file with author).
3. See, e.g., CUKWURAH, supra note 2, at 121; Kaikobad, supra note 2, at 119.
4. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J.
6 (June 15) [hereinafter Temple of Preah Vihear]. See infra Part II.A.
5. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. at 15. See infra Part II.D.
6. See, e.g., Steven Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the
Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 590 (1996). See infra Part II.B.
7. See, e.g., Kaikobad, supra note 2, at 119 (noting that "[iun most cases,
boundary changes imply the diminution and enhancement of territory for the States on
either side of it, with all the attendant escalations in friction and tension between them");
Ratner, supra note 6, at 591 (asserting that reliance on historical boundaries reduces the
prospects of armed conflict by providing a clear outcome).
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relationship between the disputing parties and, more importantly,
might have a broader destabilizing effect on other countries.8
In recent years, however, the principle of the stability and
continuity of boundaries has suffered some erosion. Rather than simply
sanctify historical lines, international adjudicators have, in several
cases, acknowledged the need to also take other considerations into
account when determining the location of international boundaries.9
These considerations have included securing the access of borderland
populations to water resources, preserving nomadic lifestyles,
enhancing the self-determination of minority groups, bolstering peace
efforts, and protecting cultural heritage sites.10 In some cases,
adjudicators explicitly acknowledged the need to modify the historical
boundaries in order to promote such "human-oriented"
considerations.11 In others, they shied away from directly challenging
the principle of stability, instead using these considerations as an
interpretive tool that allegedly assisted them in determining the
location of the historical boundary.12 Either way, given the long-
standing hegemony and deep hold of the stability principle, this
development seems to represent a paradigm shift in the adjudication
of international boundary disputes.
Surprisingly, this shift has slipped below the radar of legal
scholars. In order to fill this gap, this Article offers an in-depth analysis
of the emerging boundary jurisprudence and examines its normative
implications. It discusses recent decisions in which international
judges and arbitrators explicitly or implicitly departed from the
principle of the stability of boundaries-namely, the decisions
regarding Delimiting Abyei Area (Government of Sudan/Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army) (Abyei),13 Frontier Dispute
(Burkina Faso/Niger) (Burkina Faso/Niger),14 and the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation) (Cambodia v. Thailand)
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Niger), Judgment, 2013 I.C.J. 44 (Apr. 16)
[hereinafter Burk. Faso/Niger] (water resources); id. (separate opinion of Cancado
Trindade, J.) (nomadic populations); Delimiting Abyei Area (Government of
Sudan/Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army), Final Award, 48 I.L.M. 1245 (July
20, 2009) [hereinafter Abyei] (self-determination of peoples and enhancement of peace
efforts); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thai.),
Judgment, 2013 J.C.J. 281 (Nov. 11) [hereinafter Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for
Interpretation)] (cultural heritage sites). See infra Part III.
11. See, e.g., Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 97 (separate opinion of Cancado
Trindade, J.); Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation), 2013 I.C.J 322, ]f
31-33, 65 (separate opinion of Cancado Trindade, J.). See also infra Part V.B.
12. See, e.g., Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 44, } 101 (interpreting a 1927
boundary delineation order in a manner that facilitates equal access to water resources);
Abyei, 48 I.L.M. 1245 (interpreting a boundary agreement in a manner that promotes
peace and national self-determination). See infra Part V.B.
13. Abyei, 48 I.L.M. 1245.
14. Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 44.
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(Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation))15-and explains
their novelty by comparing them to earlier judgments and awards that
strictly applied the stability principle. It then engages in a normative
evaluation of this legal development, arguing that the introduction of
considerations other than boundary stability into boundary dispute
settlement marks a positive evolution in the adjudication of boundary
disputes.
In making this normative claim, the Article draws on insights
generated by the Critical Border Studies (CBS) literature. CBS is an
emerging academic field within the broader field of political geography,
which investigates the sources, functions, and effects of borders from a
critical perspective. Employing such critical social theories as
Marxism, feminism, critical race theory, post-colonialism, and
environmentalism, CBS scholars attempt to challenge prevailing
practices, norms, and conceptions related to borders and to reveal the
power asymmetries that enable them.16 Curiously enough, this
academic interest in borders has emerged at the same time that
scholars have argued that globalization processes erode national
boundaries and diminish their importance.1 7 Viewed against this
backdrop, CBS may be seen as a counter-response to the "borderless
world" discourse sparked by globalization. CBS scholarship shows that
national borders still have a great influence on the life conditions and
opportunities of many people in the world, especially in developing
countries.18 It therefore calls for an ongoing examination and
reexamination of the role and impact of borders in the global era.
Situated outside the realm of law, the CBS literature sheds light
on the political biases underlying the traditional adjudicatory
approach to boundary disputes.'9 It suggests that the formalistic
adherence to historical boundaries that were drawn by European
colonizers many years ago with the sole purpose of facilitating their
control over foreign territories reflects the Eurocentric tendencies of
contemporary international law.20 While international adjudicators
who uphold colonial boundaries usually do not deny their dubious
origins and the injustices that they cause, they nevertheless assert that
respecting these boundaries is preferable to risking international
15. Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation), 2013 I.C.J. 281.
16. See, e.g., David Newman, On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,
18 J. BORDERLANDS STUD. 13 (2003) (noting that borders are social institutions that
reflect and reinforce power hierarchies). See infra Part IVA.
17. See, e.g., Stanley Waterman, Boundaries and the Changing World Political
Order, in GLOBAL BOUNDARIES 23-35 (Clive Schofield ed., 1994).
18. See, e.g., David Newman, The Lines that Continue to Separate Us: Borders in
our 'Borderless' World, 30 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 143 (2006) [hereinafter Newman,
The Lines that Continue to Separate Us] (noting that CBS emerged as a counternarrative
to the borderless world discourse that has accompanied much of globalization theory).
19. See infra Part IV.C.
20. Id.
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stability.21 A CBS perspective casts doubt on this proposition and calls
for a different balance between the conflicting interests. Importantly,
CBS emphasizes that the process of rebalancing the relevant interests
should be reflective and dialectic, attentive to the narratives and
experiences of various stakeholders, and open to bottom-up, periphery-
center influences.22
Inspired by these notions, this Article discusses possible ways to
further develop and refine the recent adjudicatory trend of
incorporating human-oriented considerations into boundary dispute
settlement. It suggests that international tribunals delineating inter-
state boundaries should take into account three types of
considerations. The first type concerns the impact of boundaries on the
people who live near them. For example, international adjudicators
should strive to ensure that boundaries do not prevent local
populations from accessing their agricultural lands or other livelihood
resources. In addition, they should be sensitive to the ethnic, national,
or tribal affiliations of local populations and refrain from splitting
vulnerable communities across different states in a manner that may
undermine their self-determination. The second type of consideration
concerns the promotion of peaceful relations between bordering states.
As noted above, under the traditional approach, this purpose was
essentially connected with adherence to historical boundaries.
However, a more nuanced approach acknowledges that, in some cases,
this purpose may be better served by alternative solutions that
promote ongoing cooperation between the parties, such as the creation
of a jointly administered transboundary environmental or economic
"peace park." The third type of consideration has to do with the impact
of the boundary on third parties or on the international community at
large. International interests may be at stake, for example, when the
contested boundary area includes a site of special religious or cultural
value to people living outside the bordering states.
It should be emphasized that these considerations are not
intended to replace the principle of boundary stability. In the absence
of a plausible alternative to a world order that is based on territorial
nation-states, and given the political impossibility of redistributing the
world territory among states on an equitable basis, respecting existing
boundaries seems to represent he best available guiding principle for
adjudicating boundary disputes. This guiding principle, however,
should not be treated-as it was until recently-as a decisive one.
21. See, e.g., infra note 78 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Noel Parker & Nick Vaughan-Williams, Critical Border Studies:
Broadening and Deepening the 'Lines in the Sand'Agenda, 17 GEOPOLITICS 727 (2012)
[hereinafter Parker & Vaughan-Williams, Critical Border Studies]; Noel Parker & Nick
Vaughan-Williams, Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical Border Studies,
14 GEOPOLITICS 582 (2009) [hereinafter Parker & Vaughan-Williams, Lines in the
Sand?]; Newman, The Lines that Continue to Separate Us, supra note 18.
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Instead, it should be subject to exceptions and limitations dictated by
the fundamental interests of those affected.
This new approach is not only more just and equitable than the
traditional one, but is also more compatible with contemporary global
realities. During most of the twentieth century, inter-state territorial
conflicts posed a major threat to international peace and security.23
Today, however, domestic and transnational ethnic and religious
tensions, economic distress, and environmental degradation present
threats that are just as serious to international stability and
prosperity.24 These realities suggest that international adjudicators
settling boundary disputes (or indeed, any other type of dispute) cannot
ignore the economic, social, and environmental implications of their
decisions.
The Article proceeds in four parts: Part II presents the traditional
approach of international courts and arbitration tribunals to land
boundary disputes. It describes the strategies that international
tribunals employed to ensure the finality and stability of boundaries
and demonstrates how economic, demographic, and geographical
factors, as well as equity considerations, were consistently dismissed
as irrelevant for resolving boundary disputes. Part III traces the shift
that has recently occurred in the international adjudication of
boundary disputes. Focusing on the cases of Abyei, Burkina
Faso /Niger, and Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation),
it shows how human-oriented considerations are increasingly
infiltrating boundary dispute settlement. It also discusses the possible
connection between these developments and the broader process of the
"humanization" of international law identified by many legal scholars.
In Parts IV and V, the Article turns from a descriptive to a
normative analysis. Part IV introduces the emerging field of CBS and
reviews the limited role that it has so far played in international law
scholarship. It then discusses some of the major themes and insights
of the CBS literature and examines their implications for the
resolution of boundary disputes. It also explains how some of these
themes are reflected in the recent cases discussed in Part III. Part V
draws on this emerging jurisprudence, as well as on CBS notions, to
sketch the contours of a possible reform in international boundary
adjudication. It maps out the considerations that should be taken into
account by international adjudicators deciding boundary disputes and
examines possible ways to balance them against the principle of
boundary stability. Part VI concludes the discussion.
23. See UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS,
CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 11
(2004) (suggesting that inter-state wars were the dominant form of violent conflict
during most of the twentieth century).
24. See id. at 11-14 (discussing contemporary threats to international peace and
security).
.1192017]
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II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Despite the centrality of the peaceful settlement of boundary
disputes to international relations, the international law of boundaries
has never been codified, and there have been relatively few attempts
by international lawyers to provide a systematic account of applicable
norms and principles.2 5 However, a careful examination of the
jurisprudence of international courts and arbitration tribunals during
the twentieth century reveals that these authorities have developed
and applied a rather coherent approach to the settlement of boundary
disputes. At the heart of this approach lies the principle of the stability
of boundaries, which entails that once a boundary has been
established, it is extremely difficult to challenge or revise it without
the consent of all the bordering states.2 6
This principle has manifested itself in the adoption of a tripartite
method for adjudicating boundary disputes.27 Under this method, the
international tribunal first examines whether the parties or their
predecessors concluded a treaty that delimited their mutual
boundaries.2 8 Where such a treaty exists, the tribunal will attempt to
uphold it at almost any price. Hence, neither alleged defects in the
original commitment nor any fundamental change in circumstances or
law will usually be accepted as sufficient grounds for challenging such
a treaty. Second, in cases where the parties to the dispute formed part
of a single colonial territory, the internal lines that divided them into
distinct administrative units will be sanctified as their international
boundaries (the uti possidetis principle).29 Third, in the absence of any
formally delineated boundaries, effective control of territory will be
considered a decisive criterion, overriding competing territorial claims
that are based, for instance, on historic ties or equity considerations.3 0
The following Sections demonstrate this tripartite method through a
brief analysis of key boundary delineation cases from the previous
century.
A. Treaties
A well-known International Court of Justice (ICJ) case that aptly
demonstrates the importance that international adjudicators attach to
sustaining treaty-formed boundaries is Sovereignty over Certain
25. These accounts include CHARLES DE VISSCHER, PROBLEMES DE CONFINS EN
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1969); CUKWURAH, supra note 2; Bernstein, supra note
2.
26. See, e.g., CUKWURAH, supra note 2, at 121; Kaikobad, supra note 2, at 119.
27. Cf. Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of
Justice, 53 DUKE L.J. 1779, 1803 (2004) (identifying such a tripartite method in the
boundary jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice).
28. Id. at 1803-06
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1806-07.
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Frontier Land.3 ' In this case, the Netherlands argued that a particular
provision of the 1843 Boundary Convention that it had concluded with
Belgium, which attributed certain plots of land to Belgium, should be
invalidated due to a mistake. The relevant provision purported to
"transcribe word for word" another document created in 1836.32 The
Netherlands showed, however, that the 1836 document was in fact
different from the 1843 Convention in that it allocated the disputed
plots to the Netherlands.3 3 Although the Netherlands provided good
evidence to support its claim of mistake, presenting the only remaining
copy of the 1836 document, the ICJ preferred to rely on "venturesome
hypotheses"34 to reach the conclusion that this copy was not an
authoritative one and, therefore, that no mistake had been proved and
that the 1843 Boundary Convention was valid and binding upon the
parties.35
In a similar vein, in Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand) (Temple of Preah Vihear), the ICJ went quite far in
dismissing Thailand's challenge to the validity of a delimitation map
that placed the ruins of the ancient Temple of Preah Vihear on the
Cambodian side of the Thailand/Cambodia border.36 The relevant
delimitation map had been drawn up by a mixed Boundary
Commission established under the terms of a 1904 Boundary Treaty
between Siam (Thailand) and France (the former ruler of Cambodia).
37
Thailand argued that, with respect to the area of Preah Vihear, the
map did not reflect the common intention of the parties, since it
departed from the watershed line that had been defined as the agreed
upon boundary line in the 1904 Treaty.38 The court dismissed this
claim, asserting that Thailand had accepted the map, if not by its
conduct then by its failure to protest against it for many years.3
Moreover, even if this acceptance was based on an error with
respect to the location of the boundary, Thailand could arguably have
avoided this error and was therefore precluded from invoking it as a
consent-vitiating factor.40 The court added that, as a matter of treaty
interpretation, the map should be viewed as an integral part of the
boundary treaty, and the line indicated on it should be considered to
31. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J.
209 (June 20).
32. Id. at 216.
33. Id. at 216-17.
34. Id. at 252, 254 (separate opinion by Moreno Quintana, J.).
35. Id. at 222-27 (majority opinion).
36. Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. at 6.
37. Id. at 16-21.
38. Article 1 of the boundary treaty provides that in the area of Preah Vihear,
the frontier will follow the watershed line. Article 3 of the same treaty provides that a
mixed commission shall carry out the delimitation of the frontier determined by Article
1. Id.
39. Id. at 23.
40. Id. at 26-27.
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represent the parties' intention. In this context, the court asserted
that, "when two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the
primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is impossible if
the line so established can . . . be called in question . . . whenever any
inaccuracy by reference to a clause in the parent treaty is discovered."41
Another interpretative strategy that the ICJ and its predecessor-
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)-employed in
order to ensure the stability and finality of boundaries was to assert
the exhaustiveness of boundary treaties. In its Advisory Opinion in
Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq,42 the PCIJ had to establish the
meaning of a provision in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which provided
that, if Turkey and the United Kingdom (the ruler of Iraq at that time)
failed to reach an agreement regarding the boundary between Turkey
and Iraq within a certain amount of time, "the dispute shall be referred
to the Council of the League of Nations."4 3 The Council of the League
of Nations asked the court to determine whether the authority invested
in it under the Lausanne Treaty provision was binding or merely
hortatory. The court found that it was binding, reasoning that "the
intention of the Parties was, by means of recourse to the Council, to
ensure a definitive and binding solution of the dispute which might
arise between them."44 It went further to state that "any article
designed to fix a frontier should, if possible, be so interpreted that the
result of the application of its provisions in their entirety should be the
establishment of a precise, complete and definitive frontier."45
The PCIJ's statement regarding the need to interpret boundary-
setting provisions in a manner that promotes definiteness was
reiterated by the ICJ in Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad).4 6 In this
case, Libya argued that the Treaty of Friendship between Libya and
France (the ruler of Chad at that time) in 1955 did not settle the entire
boundary between the two countries, but merely parts of it. 47 The court
rejected this claim, asserting that the text of the 1955 treaty "clearly
conveys the intention of the parties to reach a definitive settlement of
the question of their common frontiers."48 The court also maintained
that, even though the 1955 treaty had a set duration of twenty years-
which had elapsed by the time the boundary dispute was brought
before the court-the borders determined by this treaty must be
understood to be permanent, "for any other approach would vitiate the
fundamental principle of the stability of boundaries."49
41. Id. at 34.
42. Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey
and Iraq), Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12 (Nov. 21).
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id. at 19.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
47. Id. ¶ 18.
48. Id. ¶ 51.
49. Id. ¶ 72.
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B. Uti Possidetis
As discussed above, traditional adjudicators have used various
instruments and strategies in order to uphold treaty-based boundaries
and assert their finality and exhaustiveness. However, in cases where
there was no boundary treaty to enforce, international tribunals
attempted to promote stability by resorting to the doctrine of uti
possidetis. The doctrine of uti possidetis provides that states emerging
from decolonization or from the dissolution of a federal republic shall
inherit the internal administrative borders that they held at the time
of independence.5 0 This doctrine has its origins in ancient Roman
private property law5 1 and reemerged as a doctrine of modern
international boundary law at the beginning of the nineteenth century
in the context of decolonization in Latin America.52 In accordance with
this doctrine, the lines that the Spanish Empire drew to divide its
colonies into separate administrative units were transformed into
international boundaries when these colonies gained independence.5 3
For more than a century, the doctrine was hardly invoked or applied
outside Latin America. But in the mid-twentieth century, as
decolonization spread across Africa and Asia, uti possideties was
imported from Latin America into these continents, serving to define
the boundaries between new states that were previously governed by
the same colonial power.54
The uti possidetis doctrine was not invented by international
judges or arbitrators. It was put forward by states themselves, mainly
through the adoption of bilateral and regional agreements and
declarations.5 5 However, international adjudicators made important
contributions to the clarification, development, and expansion of the
doctrine, all with the aim of ensuring the stability and continuity of
boundaries.
For example, in Certain Boundary Questions between Colombia
and Venezuela, the arbitrator, the Swiss Federal Council, elaborated
on the advantages of the uti possidetis rule.56 It stipulated that, even
50. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 590
51. On the Roman origins of the term 'uti possidetis,' see for example, JOHN
MOORE, Memorandum on Uti Possidetis: Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration 1911, in 3
COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE 328, 328-32 (1944).
52. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 590.
53. Id.; see also OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 669 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts, eds., 9th ed., 1992); Malcolm Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle
of Uti Possidetis Juris Today, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75 (1996).
54. See Shaw, supra note 53, at 100-05 (describing how the uti possidetis
doctrine migrated from Latin America to Africa and Asia).
55. See, e.g., Org. of African Unity [OAU], Resolution on Border Disputes Among
African States, AHG/Res. 16(1), 1 2 (17-21 July 1964) (declaring that all member states
"pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national
independence").
56. Sentence Arbitrale du Conseil F6d6ral Suisse sur Diverses Questions de
1232017/
124 VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
though there were many areas in Latin America that had never been
explored or occupied by "civilized nations," in accordance with the
principle of uti possidetis these territories were considered to belong
"to the respective republics that succeeded the Spanish Provinces to
which these lands were connected by virtue of old royal decrees."57 This
legal presumption protected Latin America from "the designs of the
colonizing states of Europe against lands which otherwise they could
have sought to proclaim as [terra] nullius."5 8 At the same time, uti
possidetis allegedly reduced boundary conflicts between the successor
states of the Spanish Empire and thus promoted peace and stability.5 9
This advantage of reducing boundary conflicts between
neighboring states eventually came to be understood as the primary
function of uti possidetis.60 This point was made clear by the ICJ in
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) (Burkina Faso/Mali), which
was the first judicial examination of the application of the uti possidetis
doctrine in Africa.6 1 The court emphasized that uti possidetis was a
firmly established international law principle of a general scope, whose
"obvious purpose" was "to prevent the independence and stability of
new States [from] being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked
by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the
administering power."62 The court also noted that uti possidetis was
"logically connected" with the phenomenon of decolonization "wherever
it occurred."63
Although the ICJ affirmed the universal character of the uti
possidetis doctrine in the Burkina Faso/Mali case, it also seems to
have confined the scope of the doctrine to the context of decolonization.
A few years later, however, the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia
(the Badinter Committee) relied upon this case to conclude that the uti
possidetis doctrine was applicable to any situation where
administrative units gain independence, including the dissolution of a
federal republic like Yugoslavia.64 This approach was subsequently
adopted by the new states emerging from the former Soviet Union and
Limites pendants entre la Colombie et le V6nizuela (March 24, 1922), cited in James
Brown Scott, The Swiss Decision in the Boundary Dispute between Colombia and
Venezuela, 16 AM. J. INT'L. L. 420, 428 (1922).
57. Scott, supra note 56, at 429.
58. Id. at 429.
59. Id.
60. See Malcolm Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries, 3 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 478, 492-93 (1997).
61. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22,
1986).
62. Id. at 565.
63. Id. at 566.
64. Arbitration Commission of the European Community Conference on
Yugoslavia, Opinion no. 3 (20 Nov. 1991), reprinted in Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the
Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination ofPeople, 3
EUR. J. INT'L L. 182, 184-85 (1992).
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Czechoslovakia.65 Hence, the commitment to boundary stability has
allowed uti possidetis to evolve from a regional norm that was tailored
for a particular historic context into a generally applicable universal
norm.
C. Effective Control
Finally, in cases where there was neither a treaty-based, nor an
uti possidetis boundary line to enforce (not even an imperfect or
contested one)-and only in these cases-international tribunals have
decided boundary disputes on the basis of effective control.66 A close
examination of the relevant cases suggests that effective control was
preferred over other criteria precisely because it was deemed to better
promote certainty and stability in inter-state relations. In the Island
of Palmas case, for instance, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
decided that sovereignty over Palmas-a small island located between
the Philippine archipelago and the Netherlands East Indies (today
Indonesia)-resided with the Netherlands, which exercised continuous
authority over the island, and not with the United States (the ruler of
the Philippines at that time), whose claims for sovereignty were based
on the first discovery of Palmas by its predecessor, Spain.67 The
arbitrator asserted that discovery alone, without any subsequent act of
administration, at best created an inchoate title for Spain, which was
trumped by the Netherlands' continuous and peaceful control of the
island.68 The arbitrator emphasized the importance of displaying
65. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 596-98 (discussing the application of the uti
possidetis doctrine in the former Communist bloc).
66. Conversely, when a boundary agreement or an uti possidetis line did exist,
adjudicators rejected competing claims for sovereignty based on effective control. See,
e.g., Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J. Rep.
209, 227-30 (June 20); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303, 352-55
(Oct. 10). However, in some cases effective control served to indicate the exact location
of a contested treaty or uti possidetis line. See, e.g., Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. Intervening), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 351, 563 (Sept. 11).
67. Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). The
Island of Palmas case is not a 'classic' land boundary dispute in that it does not discuss
the partition of some continuous territory, but rather addresses the question of
sovereignty over an island located between two adjacent countries. However, as several
commentators have noted, there is no clear-cut distinction between boundary disputes
and other types of territorial disputes, and some cases may resist classification. Disputes
relating to sovereignty over offshore islands, including the Island of Palmas case and the
cases mentioned in notes seventy-two and seventy-three below, represent an example of
such grey area cases. For the purpose of the present discussion, however, they may be
considered as boundary disputes. On the relationship between boundary disputes and
other territorial disputes, see for example, CUKWURAH, supra note 2, at 6; NORMAN HILL,
CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS 25 (1945); ROBERT Y.
JENNINGS, THE AcQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1963).
68. Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 843-46 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928).
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sovereignty in a manner that "offer[s] certain guarantees to other
States,"69 and that provides any state that might have a competing
claim to sovereignty "a reasonable possibility for ascertaining the
existence of a state of things contrary to her real or alleged rights."70
Like the PCA, the PCIJ and the ICJ also adopted the test of
peaceful and continuous display of authority in cases that did not
involve any formal delineation of boundaries.7 ' In some of these cases,
the display of authority included such clearly sovereign acts as the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction and the registration of real estate
transactions.72 In other cases, especially those regarding thinly
populated or unsettled areas, the court was willing to assert erritorial
rights on the basis of rather limited manifestations of sovereignty by
one of the parties, provided that the other party could not present a
stronger case for effective control.7 3 Faced with a choice between
limited yet continuous manifestations of authority and less tangible
decision criteria such as historic ties, feudal titles, or equity
considerations, the PCIJ and ICJ preferred to base their decisions on
the former, which were assumed to provide greater clarity and
certainty for the parties.
D. Dismissal of Other Considerations
As the foregoing overview shows, international judges and
arbitrators have often gone to great lengths to uphold historic
boundary lines. Their explicitly stated purpose in so doing has been to
promote the stability, continuity, and finality of boundaries. In
accordance with this policy, considerations that did not support
stability and continuity were dismissed as irrelevant to resolving
boundary disputes.
In Temple of Preah Vihear, for example, the parties gave a
prominent place in their submissions to arguments invoking various
topographical, historical, religious, and archaeological factors to
support their claims.74 The court, however, discounted all these
arguments with the brief statement hat it was "unable to regard them
as legally decisive."7 5 In Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), the court
asserted that the dispute was "conclusively determined" by the 1955
boundary treaty, and refused even to consider Libya's claims regarding
69. Id. at 846.
70. Id. at 867.
71. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
72. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17).
73. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
53 (Apr. 5); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon.[Malay.), 2002
I.C.J. 625 (Dec. 17).
74. Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. at 15.
75. Id.; see also id. at 53-54 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
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the territorial rights of the indigenous tribes that inhabited the
disputed area.76
Moving from treaty to uti possidetis cases, in the Burkina
Faso/Mali case, the ICJ refused to modify the uti possidetis line on the
basis of justice considerations.7 7 In this context, the court famously
stated that "the obvious deficiencies of many Frontiers inherited from
colonization, from the ethnic, geographical or administrative
standpoint, cannot support an assertion that the modification of these
frontiers is necessary or justifiable on the ground of considerations of
equity."7 8 In Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Salvador/Honduras), El Salvador requested that the court apply,
alongside the uti possidetis doctrine, considerations of a "human
nature," such as the high population density and the scarcity of natural
resources in El Salvador, as compared to the richer and relatively
sparsely populated Honduras.7 9 The court, however, asserted that
these considerations could not justify any deviation from the uti
possidetis line.8 0
To take one more example, in Honduras Borders, the arbitration
agreement between Honduras and Guatemala provided that the
arbitration tribunal may modify the 1821 uti possidetis line between
the parties as it sees fit if it "finds that either Party has during its
subsequent development acquired beyond this line interests which
must be taken into consideration in establishing the final frontier."8'
Despite the explicit wording of this provision, the tribunal did not use
it to modify the existing uti possidetis line. Instead, it merely derived
from it the authority to fix the boundary itself in those areas where the
original uti possidetis line could not be established.82 Moreover, in
exercising this power, the tribunal pursued a narrow interpretation of
the criteria set forth in the arbitration agreement, asserting that the
language "interests acquired by the parties during their subsequent
development" essentially referred to actual possession of territory.
Hence, the tribunal stated that, in fixing the boundary, it would not
rely upon any geographic, military, or economic considerations.8 3
Before turning to a discussion of the recent changes in the
international adjudication of boundary disputes, it is worth noting
that, even in its heyday, the traditional approach was not free from
doubt. It was challenged, for example, in the dissenting opinions of the
76. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, 11 17, 24-26, 75-
76 (Feb. 3).
77. Frontier Dispute (Burk. FasofMali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 554 (Dec. 22)
78. Id. 1 149.
79. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar.
Intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, IT 40, 57, 58 (Sep. 11).
80. Id. ¶ 58.
81. Honduras Borders (Guat. v. Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A 1307, 1311 (1933).
82. Id. at 1352.
83. Id.
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judges in such classic cases as Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land
(Belgium/Netherlands) and Temple of Preah Vihear, where the
majority was criticized for going too far in its efforts to uphold the
relevant boundary treaty.84 The alternative solution the dissenting
judges offered, however, was not based on some innovative approach to
boundary delineation, but rather either on a different interpretation of
the contested boundary treaty or on the principle of effective control. It
is only in recent years that considerations of a different type-ones that
focus on human experiences and needs and that take into account
cultural and socioeconomic factors-have been explicitly invoked in
boundary dispute settlement processes. As demonstrated below, the
rise of such considerations does not mean that boundary continuity and
stability do not matter anymore; however, it emphasizes the need to
balance continuity and stability against other principles and objectives
that are arguably just as important for contemporary international
law.
III. THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Abyei Arbitration
Abyei is a small strip of land situated between the Muslim north
and the Animist south of Sudan. The area's strategic location, rich oil
fields, and fertile land have turned it into a major source of contention
in the decades-long North-South Sudanese civil war.85 In 2005, when
the Government of Sudan (GoS), representing the north, and the
Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A),
representing the south, signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
they dedicated a separate protocol to the problem of Abyei.86 This
protocol accorded Abyei a special administrative status for an interim
period, and provided that, at the end of this period, the residents of
Abyei would hold a separate referendum to decide whether to join the
north or south.87 The Abyei Protocol also prescribed the establishment
84. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 230-
32 (June 20) (separate declaration by Lauterpacht, J.); id. at 233-51 (Armand-Ugon, J.,
dissenting); id. at 252-58 (Moreno Quintana, J., dissenting); Temple of Preah Vihear,
1962 I.C.J. at 67-74 (Moreno Quintana, J., dissenting); id. at 75-100 (Wellington Koo,
J., dissenting); id. at 101-46 (Spender, J., dissenting).
85. On the sources of the dispute over Abyei see for example, Amira Awad
Osman, Conflict over Scarce Resources and Identity: The Case of Abyei, Sudan, in
RESOURCES, PEACE AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 249 (Ulf Johansson Dahre
ed., 2013); Douglas H. Johnson, Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan's
Comprehensive Peace Agreement?, 107 AFRICAN AFF. 1 (2008).
86. Protocol between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict, ch. IV, May 26, 2004
[hereinafter Abyei Protocol], as incorporated into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army, 63, Jan. 9, 2005 [hereinafter Comprehensive Agreement].
87. See Abyei Protocol, supra note 86, art. 1. The Southern Sudan referendum
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of an Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC), which would demarcate
the boundaries of the Abyei area.88 The ABC's findings would
determine who would be eligible to participate in the Abyei referendum
and which area exactly would be attached to the north or south in
accordance with the referendum's results.89
The Abyei area was defined in the Abyei Protocol as "the area of
the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905"
(Formula).9 0 This Formula referred to the historic decision of the
British governinent of Sudan to redraw the southeastern border of the
province of Kordofan so as to include in it the entire territory inhabited
by the Ngok Dinka people.9 1 The exact scope of this territory, however,
was unclear. Hence, the ABC was empowered to examine archival
material and collect oral testimonials in order to identify it.92
In its arguments before the ABC, the GoS asserted that the
Formula referred only to the territory that was actually transferred to
Kordofan in 1905 (the territorial interpretation), whereas the SPLM/A
claimed that it referred to the entire territory inhabited by the Ngok
Dinka in 1905, including the territory that had already been part of
the province of Kordofan at that time (the tribal interpretation).9 3 The
ABC adopted the tribal interpretation, which resulted in the
demarcation of a larger, more north-reaching Abyei area than would
have been demarcated under the territorial interpretation.94 Fearful of
losing all this area to Southern Sudan following the referendum, the
GoS argued that, in applying the tribal interpretation, the ABC
exceeded its mandate, and therefore its findings had no binding
power.95 Even though the ABC's report was supposed to be final,96 the
parties agreed to refer the question whether the ABC had exceeded its
mandate to an arbitration tribunal, which would operate within the
framework of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).9 7
took place in January 2011 and resulted in the establishment of the independent
Republic of South Sudan. The Abyei referendum has never been held due to ongoing
violence in this area.
88. Id. art. 5.
89. Id. art. 5.
90. Id.; Abyei Appendix: Understanding on Abyei Boundaries Commission, art.
1 [hereinafter Abyei Appendix], incorporated into Comprehensive Agreement, supra note
86, at 217.
91. ABYEl BOUNDARIES COMMISSION REPORT 17 (2005),
http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Abey-boundary-com-report-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E767-MWSU] (archived Oct. 9, 2016) [hereinafter ABYEI BOUNDARIES
COMM'N REPORT] (discussing the "1905 decision of the Condominium authorities to
administer the Ngok Dinka as part of Kordofan").
92. Abyei Appendix, supra note 90, arts. 3, 4.
93. ABYEi BOUNDARIES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 91, at 11 (presenting the
parties' positions).
94. Id. at 20-22 (presenting the ABC's conclusions).
95. Abyei, 48 I.L.M. ¶j 168-169.
96. Abyei Protocol, supra note 86, art. 5; Abyei Appendix, supra note 90, art. 5.
97. Arbitration Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan
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The PCA delivered its final award in July 2009: it found that the
ABC's adherence to the tribal interpretation and the demarcation that
resulted from it were authoritative and binding.9 8 While the PCA
emphasized the restrictive nature of its review and stated that it
examined only the reasonableness and not the correctness of the ABC's
conclusions," it nevertheless dedicated considerable space to
defending the logic of the tribal interpretation. It elaborated that, by
including within the Abyei area all the historic lands of the Ngok
Dinka, which are also their present day lands, the ABC sought to
ensure that all the members of this ethno-cultural group would be
entitled to vote in the Abyei referendum.1 0 0 In so doing, the ABC
fulfilled one of the major purposes of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, namely, to promote the right to self-determination.10 1 By
contrast, adopting the territorial interpretation might have resulted in
splitting the Ngok Dinka community and "defeating the main purpose
of the referendum, to empower [t]he Members of the Ngok Dinka
community and other Sudanese residing in the area."102
The PCA also noted that the evidence available to the ABC was
insufficient to determine the precise location of the historical
municipal boundary of Kordofan.0 3 In these circumstances, insistence
on the territorial interpretation might have led the ABC to the
conclusion that it was unable to complete the task of demarcating the
Abyei boundary. This, in turn, might have seriously undermined the
Sudanese peace process.104 According to the PCA, the ABC acted
reasonably when it preferred the interpretation that promoted peace
in Sudan. 105 All in all, the PCA underscored the appropriateness of an
interpretive approach that advanced a rapid resolution to the conflict
and, at the same time, promoted the broader goals of the peace process
as stated by the parties, including the recognition of the right to self-
determination and the enhancement of "the values of justice,
democracy, good governance, respect for fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual, mutual understanding and tolerance of
diversity within the realities of the Sudan."106
The emphasis that the PCA placed on the parties' desire to
promote self-determination and peace, and its willingness to confirm
the ABC's decision to prefer these considerations over the preservation
of historical boundaries, represented a clear departure from the
adjudicatory approach adopted by international tribunals in earlier
People's Liberation Movement/Army on Delimiting Abyei Area, arts. 1 & 5 (2008).
98. Abyei, 48 I.L.M. 1245.
99. Id. if 398-411, 486-510.
100. Id. ¶¶ 594-96.
101. Id.
102. Id. 1 595.
103. Id. ¶¶ 558-60, 618-23.
104. Id. ¶T 479-80.
105. Id. ¶} 583-659.
106. Id. 1 587.
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boundary dispute cases. As noted in Part II, those tribunals had
refused to assign any weight to the particular socio-political or
demographic realities of the parties and instead sanctified historical
boundaries, arbitrary as they might have been, in the name of the
general principle of inter-state stability. The arbitration tribunal in the
Abyei case, by contrast, acknowledged that the municipal boundaries
drawn by the colonial powers in Sudan reflected anachronistic
administrative rationales of little relevance to the contemporary
conditions and needs of Sudanese society. 107 It therefore attached no
sanctity to these boundaries.108
B. The Burkina Faso/Niger Case
Until 1960, Burkina Faso and Niger were both French colonies,
forming part of French West Africa.1 09 After they gained independence,
the two states consensually delineated their common frontier.11 0 One
section of the boundary, however, remained contested.111 In 2009, the
parties submitted their dispute over the unmarked section of the
boundary to the ICJ.112 In their Special Agreement, they requested
that the court determine the disputed part of the boundary in
accordance with the "principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited
from colonization."13 More specifically, they asked the court to follow
the administrative boundary line described in the Arrt4 (order) issued
in 1927 by the Governor-General of French West Africa, and, if the
Arrtd should not suffice, to follow the line shown on an official 1960
French map.114
In order to fulfill its task, the ICJ divided the disputed section of
the boundary into several subsections and examined the Arr&6's
instructions with respect to each of them.115 Of particular interest to
this discussion is the interpretation offered by the court of the Arrt's
107. Id. ?1 644-45.
108. It is noteworthy that one of the Tribunal members, Judge Awn Al-
Khasawneh, appended a dissenting opinion in which he strongly criticized the majority
decision. Al-Khasawneh opined that by adopting the tribal interpretation the ABC
exceeded its mandate, and so did the Tribunal when it upheld this interpretation.
Moreover, according to Al-Khasawneh, the ABC was clearly biased in favor of South
Sudan, yet the Tribunal ignored this partiality as well as the many other deficiencies of
the ABC's report, because it was anxious to ensure the finality of what it believed to be
the only immediate solution to the Abyei dispute. In so doing, however, the Tribunal in
fact missed an opportunity to put forward a just and legally defendable solution that
could have been acceptable to both parties and truly promoted a durable peace. See id.
(Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh, J., dissenting).
109. Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. at ¶ 22.
110. Id. ¶ 23.
111. Id. ¶ 24-29
112. Id. ¶ 30.
113. Id. ¶ 2.
114. Id.
115. Id. ¶ 34.
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description of the boundary in the area of the Boss6bangou village,
which is situated a few hundred meters from the Sirba River, on its
right bank.116 The Arr& provided that the boundary line "reach[ed]
the River Sirba at Bossebangou."'" According to Burkina Faso, this
meant that the boundary was located on the right bank between the
river and the village.118
Niger, on its part, did not take a view on the matter, on account of
its argument that the Arr&t should not have been applied to this area
in the first place.11 9 The court, however, found that the Arrt4 was
applicable and that, under its terms, the boundary passed own the
middle of the Sirba River. The court reasoned that the Arrat6's use of
the verb "reach," as opposed to "cut," suggests that the boundary did
not cross the river at that point but rather passed in it, presumably
following its median line.120 The court added that,
[m]oreover, there is no evidence before the Court that the River Sirba in the area
of Bossebangou was attributed entirely to one of the two colonies. In this regard,
the Court notes that the requirement concerning access to water resources of all
the people living in the riparian villages is better met by a frontier situated in
the river than on one bank or the other.121
The court made a remarkable move here. In order to ensure access
to the river waters for villagers on both sides, it was willing to stretch
its mandate quite far. As Judge Daudet notes in his separate opinion,
the instructions provided by the Arrtd with respect to the frontier line
in the Sirba/Bossebangou area seem to meet the definition of
"insufficient," which, under the terms of the Special Agreement, calls
for recourse to the 1960 French map.122 Had the court turned to that
map, however, the border would have been located on the right bank-
a result that was inconsistent with the court's conception of what was
just and equitable in this case.123 In these circumstances, the court
preferred to adopt a creative interpretation of the Arrt6 that secured
the water needs of local populations, even though it knew that the
boundary line thus determined might be different from the historic
colonial boundary.
Also noteworthy is the court's plea to the parties to exercise their
authority over the territories under their sovereignty "with due regard
to the needs of the populations concerned, in particular those of the
nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, and to the necessity to overcome
116. Id. ¶ 100.
117. Id. ¶ 70.
118. Id. 1 100.
119. Id.
120. See id. ¶ 101 (explaining that the frontier follows the median line by noting
that "in a non-navigable river with the characteristics of the Sirba, that line best meets
the requirements of legal security inherent in the determination of a boundary").
121. Id.
122. Id. at 158 (Daudet, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 156, 160-162 (Daudet, J., concurring).
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difficulties that may arise for them because of the frontier."124 This
point is reiterated and further developed in the separate opinion issued
by Judge Canqado Trindade, who declared that "people and territory
go together"125 and that boundary delineation cannot be made in
abstracto, overlooking the human element; it must take into
consideration the needs of the local populations who live in the frontier
zone, including the need for free movement of nomadic and semi-
nomadic peoples.126 Judge Cangado Trindade grounds his position in a
general theory of contemporary international law, which places human
beings, rather than states, at the center. Within this legal order, the
determination of frontier lines must look beyond inter-state stability
and take into account the wellbeing of the peoples concerned.127 This
means that simply tracing the artificial, straight lines that the colonial
powers used to divide Africa can no longer be considered an
appropriate method for determining borders.128
Judge Bennouna expresses a similar dissatisfaction with the
traditional method of relying on colonial boundaries that were drawn
with no consideration of the needs of local populations.129 While he
does not entirely reject the reliance on colonial decrees as a means for
promoting stable relations between states, he asserts that such decrees
must not be interpreted in a formalistic or mechanical way. As he
explains, "the search for peace among States also entails ensuring
human security, namely respect for the fundamental human rights of
the persons concerned and their protection, including by international
justice."130 Judge Daudet also concedes that, in the final account, the
court cannot afford to ignore human needs such as access to water
resources.1 3 '
It is interesting to compare the ICJ's approach in the dispute
between Burkina Faso and Niger with its approach in the dispute
between Burkina Faso and Mali, decided almost three decades earlier.
The two boundary disputes were set in a similar historic and political
background (the decolonization of French West Africa), and, in both
cases, the parties requested that the court resolve the dispute by
ascertaining the border inherited from colonization. However, in the
Burkina Faso/Mali case, the court interpreted this mandate in strict
fashion, repeatedly emphasizing that its only task was to indicate the
accurate location of the colonial frontiers, which, "however
unsatisfactory they may be, possess the authority of the uti possidetis
and are thus fully in conformity with contemporary international
124. Id. 1 112.
125. Id. 1 63 (Trindade, J. concurring).
126. Id. Jf 63-69 (Trindade, J., concurring).
127. Id. 11 87-98 (Trindade, J., concurring).
128. Id. a 102 (Trindade, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 94 (Bennouna, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 95 (Bennouna, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 164 (Daudet, J., concurring).
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law."1 3 2 By contrast, in the Burkina Faso/Niger case, the ICJ's judges
accorded historical boundaries much less sanctity: while they stopped
short of expressly modifying these borders, they were very clear about
the need to accommodate the human factor.
C. The Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation) Case
The 1962 judgment of the ICJ in Temple of Preah Vihear-which
concerned a dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the location
of their common border in the area of the Preah Vihear Temple-was
discussed earlier as an example of the conservative approach of the ICJ
to boundary questions.13 3 As noted above, the court in this case was
determined to confirm the finality of a boundary delimitation map
created by the parties' predecessors in 1904, and dismissed any
challenges to its validity. 134 It also refused to consider arguments of a
historical or religious character that were made by the parties.13 5 In
the operative part of the judgment, the court stated that the temple
was located on the Cambodian side of the border and that Thailand
was under an obligation to "withdraw any military or police forces, or
other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its
vicinity on Cambodian territory."13 6
It soon turned out, however, that the parties held different views
as to the meaning of this operative part, in particular with respect to
the extent of the area that was included in the "vicinity" of the temple.
This controversy intensified in 2008, following the naming of the Preah
Vihear Temple on the UNESCO World Heritage List. In 2011,
Cambodia submitted to the court a request for interpretation of its
1962 judgment. The court delivered its judgment in 2013. Steering a
course midway between Cambodia's expansive interpretation of the
term "vicinity" and Thailand's narrower one, the court decided that
this term referred to the entire promontory on which the temple was
standing as well as to an adjacent valley, but not to the hill beyond
it.' 3 7
The court added that the parties were under an obligation to
implement its judgment in good faith and to settle any further dispute
by peaceful means.1 38 It then noted that this obligation was of
particular importance in view of the temple's "religious and cultural
significance for the peoples of the region" and its unique status as a
World Heritage Site. The court emphasized the parties' duties under
the World Heritage Convention "to cooperate between themselves and
132. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, T 149 (Dec. 22).
133. See supra notes 36-41.
134. Id.
135. Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. at 15.
136. Id. at 37.
137. Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation), 2013 I.C.J. 281, ¶¶ 81-98.
138. Id. 11 99, 105.
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with the international community in the protection of the site as a
world heritage."139
The religious, cultural, and historical importance of the temple to
local populations, as well as to the rest of humanity, is also highlighted
in the separate opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade. Continuing the
line of reasoning that he presented in the Burkina Faso/Niger case,
Judge Cangado Trindade called attention to the human needs and
interests underlying inter-state territorial disputes.140 He noted that,
by acknowledging the unique value of the Preah Vihear Temple for
people living in the region and beyond it, the court has endorsed the
"ongoing process of humanization of international law," adding that
"[a] parallel between the Judgment of 1962 and the present
interpretation of judgment of 2013 in the case of the Temple of Preah
Vihear gives clear testimony of that."141
D. The Emerging Boundary Jurisprudence and Contemporary
International Law
The recent decisions of the PCA in the Abyei case and of the ICJ
in the Burkina Faso/Niger case and the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Request for Interpretation) case, mark a fundamental development in
the international adjudication of boundary disputes. These decisions
look beyond the traditional inter-state perspective to identify the
essential interests of the communities living in the border area as well
as of other stakeholders that might be affected by the location of the
border. The interests identified include collective self-determination,
peacemaking, utilization of water resources, protection of pasture
rights, and access to heritage sites.142 Of course, this does not mean
that international adjudicators no longer care about the stability of
boundaries. However, stability is gradually being transformed from the
exclusive determinant of boundary lines into one among several
considerations that should be taken into account when delineating
boundaries. Given the long-standing dominance and the deep hold of
the stability principle, this development arguably amounts to a
paradigm shift in the adjudication of international boundary disputes.
This paradigm shift did not come out of the blue; it seems to be
related to broader developments in international law, which has
transformed from an entirely state-centered legal system into a more
human-oriented one, that is, from a system that emphasizes "state
139. Id. 1 106.
140. Id. 11 31-33 (Trindade, J., concurring); see also Request for Interpretation
of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measures, 2011 I.C.J. 537, 11 96-117 (July 18)
(Trindade, J., separate opinion).
141. Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation), 2013 I.C.J. 281, 1 65
(Trindade, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
142. See supra Part III.A.-C.
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security ... as defined by borders, statehood, territory and so on" into
a system that is concerned with "the security of persons and
peoples."1 4 3 This process may also be described as a shift from a
pluralist system that facilitates the peaceful coexistence of essentially
different but equally sovereign states to a more universal system that
promotes common values, such as the protection of fundamental
human rights. 144 The principle of the stability and continuity of
boundaries was central to the pluralist paradigm, as its main concern
was the reduction of inter-state territorial conflicts.145 However,
contemporary understandings of international law assert that inter-
state stability, important as it may be, "does not represent all that is
important even about inter-state boundaries."146  These
understandings make way for the incorporation of other considerations
into boundary dispute settlement.
The influence of general developments in international legal
thought on recent boundary adjudication can be seen in the separate
opinions of Judge Bennouna and Judge Cangado Trindade in the
Burkina Faso/Niger case, as well as in the separate opinion of Judge
Canqado Trindade in the Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for
Interpretation) case. For example, Judge Bennouna states that "[t]he
exercise of sovereignty has . . . become inseparable from responsibility
towards the population. This new approach to sovereignty should
certainly be present when the Court rules on the course of boundaries
between States."147 Delving further into the importance of the "human
factor" in contemporary international law, Judge Cangado Trindade
emphasizes that the "principle of humanity, orienting the search for
the improvement of the conditions of living of the societas gentium,"
must be seen as underlying "the new jus gentium of our times."148
According to Judge Cangado Trindade, this principle entails that the
court move beyond the territorialist approach to identify and protect
the associated human needs.149
Such explicit references to the relationship between boundary
adjudication and the core purposes of contemporary international law
cannot be found in the majority opinions in either of the recent
boundary delineation cases discussed above. It seems reasonable to
143. RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY'S LAW 4 (2011).
144. See Andrew Hurrell, International Law and the Making and Unmaking of
Boundaries, in STATES, NATIONS, AND BORDERS: THE ETHICS OF MAKING BOUNDARIES
275, 285 (Allen Buchanan & Margaret Moore eds., 2003) (discussing a progressive
response to pluralism partially as building around collectively shared values).
145. See id. at 278 (discussing the impulse towards stable and final borders under
the pluralist conception of international law).
146. Benedict Kingsbury, People and Boundaries: an 'Internationalized Public
Law'Approach, in STATES, NATIONS, AND BORDERS: THE ETHICS OF MAKING BOUNDARIES
298, 300 (Allen Buchanan & Margaret Moore eds., 2003).
147. Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 94, 95 (Bennouna J., concurring).
148. Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 97, ¶ 90 (Trindade, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original) (noting that territory is tied with population).
149. Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation), 2013 I.C.J. 322, 1 31
(Trindade, J., concurring) (noting a need for "the human factor").
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assume, however, that the general process of humanization of
international law has, to some degree, influenced those opinions. In
any event, whatever the factors inducing boundary adjudicators to
show greater sensitivity to the human factor, this Article asserts that
it is a desirable development. In order to better explain this position,
the Article now steps out of the realm of law and enters the realm of
critical geography, which offers important insights into the role and
impact of territorial phenomena like borders.
IV. CRITICAL BORDER STUDIES: A FRESH PERSPECTIVE ON
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
A. Critical Border Studies: Introductory Remarks
The last two and a half decades have seen a rapid growth in the
number of academic conferences and publications dedicated to the
study of borders.15 0 Much of this scholarly activity has taken a critical
perspective, earning it the title of critical border studies (CBS).' 5
Whether this title represents a distinct academic field, and whatever
the parameters for defining such a field may be, this Article uses the
term to refer to the sizeable and constantly expanding body of
literature that engages in a critical examination of the phenomenon of
borders. This literature addresses not only inter-state borders, but also
municipal and local borders. It exposes the common features,
functions, and implications of different types of borders, helping to
improve the understanding of apparently isolated border practices.
It is remarkable that scholarly interest in borders has increased
at the same time that globalization processes have eroded many of the
traditional forms and functions of national borders. Viewed against
this backdrop, CBS may be seen as a counter-response to globalization
or, more precisely, to the dominant discourse on globalization, which
envisions a world in which goods, services, people, and information
"flow across seamless national borders."i5 2 CBS asserts that borders
still matter.153 It notes that the processes of de-bordering have not
affected everyone in the same way: for many people in the world,
150. See, e.g., Vladimir Kolossov, Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and
Theoretical Approaches, 10 GEOPOLITICS 606 (2005) (providing a comprehensive
overview of the development of border studies from the early-twentieth century to the
present); Newman, The Lines that Continue to Separate Us, supra note 18, at 144-45
(2006) (discussing the 'renaissance' of border studies since the mid-1990s).
151. See Parker & Vaughan-Williams, Critical Border Studies, supra note 22
(discussing the concept of 'Critical Border Studies'); Parker & Vaughan-Williams, Lines
in the Sand? supra note 22 (discussing the same) .
152. Janet Ceglowski, Has Globalization Created a Borderless World?, BUS. REV.
17, 17 (1VarchlApril 1998).
153. See Newman, The Lines that Continue to Separate Us, supra note 18 (noting
that CBS emerged as a counternarrative to the borderless world discourse that has
accompanied globalization theory).
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especially for poor populations in developing countries, life conditions
and opportunities are still restrained by national borders, perhaps
even more than in the past.154 Moreover, the decline of international
borders has not been linear. Rather, the weakening of some borders
instigated the strengthening of other borders,155 or different aspects of
the same borders.156 In view of these realities, CBS scholars seek to
offer new ways for constructing and understanding contemporary
borders.
In terms of disciplinary affiliations, CBS may be described as a
branch of critical geography, which in turn may be located within the
broader context of critical social theory. As such, CBS strives to
challenge prevailing practices and conceptions related to borders, and
to reveal the power asymmetries that facilitate them. It draws on such
critical theoretical approaches as Marxism, feminism,
environmentalism, critical race theory, and post-colonialism.'5 7 In line
with these theories, CBS endeavors to show that borders are neither
natural nor neutral: they are socially and politically constructed to the
advantage of some interests and the disadvantage of others.'5 8 Hence,
borders cannot be taken for granted, but rather must be constantly
questioned and contested.5 9
But how exactly should borders be contested, and to what
purpose? Like other critical theorists, CBS scholars take two
alternative positions with respect to these questions. The first, which,
for the purposes of the present discussion, may be called the radical
154. See, e.g., Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, 49 NEW LEFT REV. 29,
38 (2008) (noting that changes in border policies may produce disparate effects on
populations based on wealth); Moria Paz, Between the Kingdom and the Desert Sun:
Human Rights, Immigration, and Border Walls, 34 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 42 (2016)
(explaining that the enjoyment of human rights greatly depends on physical borders).
155. See, e.g., ANDREW GEDDES, IMMIGRATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
TOWARDS FORTRESS EUROPE? 16--18 (2000) (observing that the removal of national
borders within Europe has spurred more rigorous control of its external borders); Didier
Bigo, Immigration Controls and Free Movement in Europe, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 579
(2009) (making a similar observation); Badiou, supra note 154, at 38 (noting that a few
decades ago, walls were used to restrict movement from the communist East to the
liberal West, whereas today they are used to restrict movement from the poor South to
the richer North).
156. The current border control regime of the United States, for example, is
designed to facilitate the movement of goods to and from Canada and Mexico, and at the
same time to prevent the entrance of illegal migrants and potential terrorists. See, e.g.,
James Anderson, Borders after 11 September 2001, 6 SPACE & POLITY 227 (2002);
Matthew Coleman, U.S. Statecraft and the U.S.-Mexico Border as Security/Economy
Nexus, 24 POL. GEOGRAPHY 185 (2004).
157. See, e.g., RETHINKING BORDERS (John C. Welchman ed., 1996) (examining
borders from various critical perspectives, including Marxism, feminism, and post-
colonialism).
158. Cf. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 26 (Donald Nicholson-
Smith trans., 1991) (arguing that space is a social product, which serves as a "tool of
thought and of action," and as a "means of control, and hence of domination, of power").
159. See, e.g., ttienne Balibar, What is a Border, in POLITICS AND THE OTHER
SCENE 75, 76 (Christine Jones et al. trans., 2002) (emphasizing the need to "overturn the
false simplicity" of the notion of borders).
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position, criticizes existing border policies and practices without
attempting to make any contribution to improving them. In the context
of critical legal studies, this mode of argumentation has been defined
as "trashing," that is, attacking a legal argument or doctrine in a
manner that is so destructive (or vague, or Utopian) that it cannot yield
any concrete legal reform.160 The second stance that a CBS work may
adopt, which may be called the pragmatic position, is more positive and
constructive than the first. It criticizes border-related problems not
only for the sake of criticizing, but also with a view towards promoting
a solution to these problems, even if the only available solutions are
partial and imperfect.161
This Article takes the pragmatic approach to CBS. It leaves aside
fundamental questions regarding the desirability and appropriateness
of international borders and does not question boundary adjudication
only on the grounds that it legitimizes and reinforces international
borders. There are certainly injustices and inequalities perpetuated by
international borders, but this Article assumes that there is currently
no feasible alternative to a world order that is based on territorially
delineated nation-states. It also assumes that these inequalities cannot
be remedied through redistribution of the world territory. It thus
accepts the principle of the stability and continuity of boundaries as a
premise of the analysis. However, it argues that this premise should
be applied with restraint and balanced with other, human-oriented
considerations.
B. Critical Border Studies in International Law Scholarship
Since the emergence of the "law and geography" movement in the
mid-1990s, geographical knowledge and reasoning-especially in their
critical guise-have had increasing influence on legal thought in such
diverse fields as property, tort, labor, local governance, and even
criminal law.162 In its early years, critical legal geography hardly
addressed international law issues. This is surprising, given the
central role that territory, boundaries, and the environment occupy in
international law. However, as critical legal geography scholarship
160. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
161. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED: THE
WORLD DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS 166-67 (2007) (offering
alternatives to free trade); John Agnew, Borders on the Mind: Re-framing Border
Thinking, 1 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 175, 186-87 (2008) (proposing shifting resources to
people rather than people to resources).
162. See generally Irus Braverman et al., Expanding the Spaces of Law, in THE
EXPANDING SPACES OF LAw: A TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY 1 (Irus Braverman et al. eds.,
2014); Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Spatial Turn in Legal Theory, 10 HAGAR:
STUD. CULTURE, POLITY & IDENTITIES 39 (2010) (noting the influence of spatial analysis
on legal theory).
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expanded, its coverage of international law topics, although still
limited,1 63 has somewhat increased.
The late marriage of international law and critical geography has
produced spatio-legal investigations into such topics as contemporary
warfare1 64 and the management and development of transboundary
natural resources. 165 As far as international boundaries are concerned,
international legal geographers have been most notably interested in
the regulation of cross-border movement. Taking a CBS perspective,
these scholars have problematized various border control policies
designed to constrain the movement of people from poorer to richer
countries. For example, some commentators have questioned the
legality and morality of extraterritorial migration control practices
such as the interception of refugee boats on the high seas or the use of
pre-entry clearance procedures in foreign airports.166 Other
commentators have critically examined the legal implications of the
recent "construction boom" of walls, wire fences, and other physical
barriers between states.16 7 Still others have analyzed the human
rights dimensions of the new surveillance technologies employed at
163. See Carl Landauer, Regionalism, Geography, and the International Legal
Imagination, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 557, 594 (2011) (arguing that despite the identity of
international law as focused on spatial relations, it has long been dominated by a
temporal (rather than geographic) imagination); Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography
Perspective on the New Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 440-50 (2007) (calling for
a greater engagement of international law and geography).
164. See, e.g., Michael D. Smith, States that Come and Go: Mapping the
Geolegalities of the Afghanistan Intervention, in THE EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW: A
TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY 142-66 (Irus Braverman et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the
"geolegal architecture" of contemporary Western interventionism focusing on
Afghanistan).
165. See, e.g., Gabriel Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Perspective of the Status of
Ground Water Resources Under the UN Watercourse Convention, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
525 (2005) (critically examining the treatment of ground water under the UN Convention
on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses from a hydrogeological
perspective).
166. See, e.g., MAARTEN DEN HEIJER, EUROPE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL ASYLUM 6-
7 (2012) (arguing that European territories gain a duty to monitor migrant's human
rights); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Refugee, the Sovereign, and the Sea: EU
Interdiction Policies in the Mediterranean, in SOVEREIGNTY GAMES: INSTRUMENTALIZING
STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND 171 (Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen eds., 2008) (noting that practices in ocean and air transport operate
with some legal uncertainty); Alison Kesby, The Shifting and Multiple Border and
International Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 106-07 (2007) (noting political
debate over asylum seekers).
167. See, e.g., Yishai Blank, Legalizing the Barrier: the Legality and Materiality
of the Israel/Palestine Separation Barrier, 46 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 309, 310-11 (2011)
(discussing Israel/Palestine border); Paz, supra note 154 (describing the construction of
massive walls to prevent immigration from poor to richer countriesa); Bigo, supra note
155 (discussing the legal implications of the shift towards interest in the protection of
Europe's border).
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border sites.168 Finally, CBS notions can also be found in international
law scholarship dealing with cross-border trade regulation.169
The legal resolution of international boundary disputes, however,
has, so far, barely been examined from a CBS perspective.170 The
remainder of this Article fills this gap. It explains how CBS can
contribute to the assessment of boundary delineation law and
adjudication. More specifically, it uses CBS insights and methodologies
to explicate the main deficiencies of the principle of the stability of
boundaries and to suggest ways to mitigate them. It notes that some
elements of this alternative approach to boundary dispute settlement
are reflected in the recently decided cases discussed in Part III, but it
argues that there is a need to further improve boundary dispute
adjudication in order to adapt it to contemporary political realities and
emerging conceptions of sovereignty, human rights, and international
security.
C. Critical Border Studies and Boundary Delineation Law
A CBS examination of the principle of the stability of boundaries
helps reveal some of its main weaknesses. Most notably, CBS questions
the proposition that historical boundaries should be taken as given and
should be respected just because they are already there. It serves as a
reminder that most of these boundaries were determined by colonial
powers with little or no reference to the needs and interests of the
people that lived within these borders. In the case of treaty-made
borders, the historical line usually reflected a political compromise
between European powers whose main concern was to control as many
overseas territories as they could. Especially in Africa, the treaty-
makers in Europe were remarkably insensitive to local ethnic
affiliations, unfamiliar with local geographic and economic conditions,
and often used arbitrary geometric lines to draw boundaries on their
maps.171 In the case of uti possidetis borders, the considerations that
168. See, e.g., Rebekah Alys Lowri Thomas, Biometrics, International Migrants
and Human Rights, 17 GLOBAL MIGRATION PERSP. (Jan. 2005) (discussing the use of
biometric data to monitor population movement).
169. See, e.g., Ruth Buchanan, Border Crossings: NAFTA, Regulatory
Restructuring, and the Politics of Place, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW,
POWER, AND SPACE 285 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001) (discussing North America's
place in the world after NAFTA).
170. A notable exception is the work of Gbenga Oduntan. See GBENGA ODUNTAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN AFRICA (2015); Gbenga Oduntan,
Africa Before the International Courts: The Generational Gap in International
Adjudication and Arbitration, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 975 (2004); Gbenga Oduntan,
The Demarcation of Straddling Villages in Accordance with the International Court of
Justice Jurisprudence: The Cameroon-Nigeria Experience, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 79
(2006) [hereinafter Oduntan, Straddling Villages] (discussing legal responses to villages
straddled between borders).
171. As stated by Lord Salisbury, the former British prime minister, in 1890:
14120177
VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
should be relevant for determining international boundaries may have
been ignored by boundary-makers simply because they never foresaw
that the internal administrative lines that they created would
eventually turn into international boundaries. Finally, in cases where
no treaty or uti possidetis lines exist and boundary disputes are decided
on the basis of effective control, the resulting demarcation may
similarly be at odds with current economic, demographic, or political
factors.
A CBS analysis would also suggest that adherence to historical
boundaries entails the acceptance of a dubious colonial legacy and the
validation of a Eurocentric perspective, not only in the sense that the
specific locations of these boundaries reflect the preferences of colonial
powers, but also in the sense that the very idea of fixed and stable
international boundaries is based on an essentially European
conception of statehood artificially applied in Africa and Asia.172 In
these places, local conditions and cultures had generated various types
of polities that were different from the European nation-state and that
did not lend themselves to strictly defined territorial borders.17 3 These
polities represent a more dynamic notion of borders, which should
arguably be acknowledged by international law.174
From a CBS perspective, adopting a dynamic approach to borders
is important not only because it can mitigate the Eurocentric bias of
international boundary law reflected in the stability principle but also
because it aligns with the changing political realities in our world. CBS
scholars emphasize the need to constantly reexamine boundary
practices and policies and reevaluate their relationships with political,
economic, and social factors.175 In the context of boundary law, such an
We have been engaged ... in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's
feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes
to each other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we
never knew exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were.
See Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 9 (Feb. 3) (Ajibola, J., concurring);
see also SAADIA TOUVAL, THE BOUNDARY POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICA 3-4 (1972)
(describing the arbitrary delineation of borders in Africa).
172. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 595 (noting that "[bjefore the arrival of the
Europeans, the notion of frontiers as defined lines was hardly known in Africa").
173. See Agnew, supra note 161, at 180-81.
174. Interestingly, a similar claim has been made with respect to real property
law. Legal geographers have shown how the essentially European idea that land rights
must be formalized and registered in order to be recognized has been transplanted into
the legal systems of colonized territories, to the detriment of local indigenous populations
who had for many years relied upon informal land rights regimes. See, e.g., Nicholas
Blomley, Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and
the Grid, 93 ANNALS ASS'N Am. GEOGRAPHERS 121, 128-29 (2003) (discussing the role of
land surveys in imposing Western property regimes upon colonial territories); Geremy
Forman & Alexandre Kedar, Colonialism, Colonization, and Land Law in Mandate
Palestine: The Zor al-Zarqa and Barrat Qisarya Land Disputes in Historical Perspective,
4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 491 (2003) (explaining how the British colonial legal system in
mandatory Palestine xtinguished indigenous rights to land).
175. See, e.g., Parker & Vaughan-Williams, Critical Border Studies, supra note
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examination reveals that the doctrine of the stability of boundaries is
not entirely compatible with the contemporary international peace and
security agenda. The main purpose of the principle of the stability of
boundaries is to reduce the causes of inter-state territorial conflicts.
While this purpose may rightly have been given decisive weight in legal
reasoning during most of the twentieth century, it does not seem to
deserve it anymore. Today, domestic and transnational interethnic and
interreligious tensions, often combined with competition over natural
resources, seem to pose just as serious a threat to human life and
welfare as boundary disputes between neighboring states. Under these
circumstances, considerations regarding the influence of borders on
intergroup relations and on socioeconomic opportunities may be more
important than the consideration of inter-state stability, and may,
thus, justify changes in the placement of historical borders, which may
also entail a change in applicable legal doctrine.
Another important feature of the CBS literature on boundary
delineation is its focus on narratives. A significant number of CBS
works involve the collection and analysis of individual and collective
stories of people who live in boundary areas or who cross or fail to cross
boundaries.176 This methodology sheds light on the impact that borders
have on the everyday life of "regular" people "far removed from the
realms of international diplomacy and statesmanship."17 It gives
voices to those who are excluded from political and judicial border-
related decision-making but who experience the effects these decisions.
At the same time, it calls for the actual inclusion of these voices in real-
life decision-making.
The empowering potential of narratives is acknowledged in the
separate opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade in Burkina Faso/Niger.
At the outset of his opinion, Judge Cangado Trindade states that the
main purpose of his separate opinion is to stress some points
concerning the "relationship between the territory at issue and the
local (nomadic and semi-nomadic) populations," which, in his view,
have not been sufficiently addressed in the court's judgment.17 8 There,
only one short paragraph was dedicated to the issue of nomadic
22; Newman, The Lines that Continue to Separate Us, supra note 18, at 145-46.
176. See, e.g., James D. Sidaway, The Poetry of Boundaries: Reflections from the
Portugese-Spanish Borderlands, in BORDERING SPACE 189 (Henk van Houtum et al. eds.,
2005); Werner Holly, Traces of German-Czech History in Biographical Interviews at the
Border: Constructions of Identities and the Year 1938 in Biirenstein-Vejprty, in LIVING
(WITH) BORDER: IDENTITY DISCOURSES ON EAST-WEST BORDERS IN EUROPE 95 (Ulrike H.
Meinhof ed., 2002); Doris Wastl-Walter et al., Bordering Silence: Border Narratives from
the Austro-Hungariasn Border, in LIVING (WITH) BORDER: IDENTITY DISCOURSES ON
EAST-WEST BORDERS IN EUROPE 75 (Ulrike H. Meinhof ed., 2002); OSCAR J. MARTINEZ,
BORDER PEOPLE: LIFE AND SOCIETY IN U.S.-MEXICO BORDERLANDS (1994).
177. See David Newman, Contemporary Research Agendas in Border Studies: An
Overview, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO BORDER STUDIES 33, 42 (Doris
Wastl-Walter ed., 2011).
178. Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 97, T 2 (Trindade, J., concurring)
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populations, in which the court made a general plea to the parties to
exercise their territorial rights with due regard to the needs of these
populations.1 79 Judge Cangado Trindade, by contrast, elaborates at
length in his opinion on the histories and experiences of nomadic
populations living in the border area and discusses in detail the
difficulties that the border might cause to them.180
Interestingly, Judge Cangado Trindade delves into this discussion
even though it is not necessary for any operative purpose, as he
ultimately concludes that, in view of the parties' bilateral and
multilateral treaty obligations to ensure the freedom of movement of
nomadic populations, any frontier to be delimited would likely have no
impact on these populations.181 Why, then, does he do it? For Judge
Cangado Trindade, it would seem, bringing the stories and
perspectives of marginalized groups into the legal process is an
essential element of the broader project of shifting the focus of
international boundary law from states and territories to human
beings.
Yet another theme that figures prominently in CBS literature has
to do with spatial hierarchies. Critical geography and CBS writers
have attempted to challenge center-periphery, top-down
understandings of how national policies in general, and boundary
policies in particular, are created and maintained.182 They have offered
alternative understandings of these processes that begin at the
margins, at the border itself. According to their view, peripheral
communities do not or should not always align with the boundary
policies dictated by the political center. Instead, boundaries can and
should be shaped in a dialectic process that incorporates the interests
of both political centers and borderland communities.'8 3 This approach
is reflected, for example, in the decision of the court in the Burkina
Faso/Niger case to give decisive weight to the water needs of local
populations in determining the location of the boundary in the area of
Boss6bangou.184 As noted above, in this case, the governments of
Burkina Faso and Niger explicitly asked the court to resolve their
boundary dispute in accordance with the principle of the stability of
boundaries inherited from colonization.18 5 The governments' concerns
were merely to secure their mutually stable relationship. The court,
179. See id. at T 112; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
180. The data that the Judge presents is gleaned from the parties' written
submissions as well as from their responses to questions that he posed to them. See Burk.
Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 97, ¶¶ 11-45 (Trindade, J., concurring).
181. See id. ¶¶ 46-47.
182. See, e.g., Gilly Hartal, Becoming Periphery: Israeli LGBT "Peripheralization,"
14 ACME: AN INT'L E-JOURNAL FOR CRITICAL GEOGRAPHIES 571, 571 (2015) (arguing
that LGBT activists in Israel are subverting the center-periphery power structure);
Parker & Vaughan-Williams, Lines in the Sand?, supra note 22.
183. See, e.g., PETER SAHLINS, BOUNDARIES: THE MAKING OF FRANCE AND SPAIN
IN THE PYRENEES 7-9 (1989).
184. See supra Part III.B.
185. See id.
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however, chose to also take into account the subsistence needs of
villagers who live in the border area, thus balancing between center
and periphery interests.
It is worth concluding this Part with a few words about the
treatment of the concept of state sovereignty in the CBS literature.
Along with international relations and international law theorists,186
CBS scholars have observed that the principles of the equal
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states-once one of the most
fundamental principles of the international system-have, in recent
years, been reconceived as limited and contingent upon such factors as
a state's ability to ensure respect for the basic human rights of its
citizens and to comply with certain obligations toward the rest of the
international community.'87 CBS scholars have been particularly
interested in the relationship between these developments and the
creation and modification of border practices and regimes.'88 They
have noted that borders constitute a key site in which alternative
conceptions of sovereignty are being reinforced or contested. The award
of the arbitration tribunal in the Abyei case and the judgment of the
ICJ in the Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation) case
offer an interesting perspective on the complex relationship between
contemporary notions of sovereignty and the making of international
borders. As discussed above, in Abyei, the arbitration tribunal
endorsed the tribal interpretation in order to promote the right to self-
determination of the Ngok Dinka people living in the frontier area
between Sudan and South Sudan, even though this interpretation
apparently undermined the territorial integrity of Sudan. In Temple of
Preah Vihear (Request for Interpretation) , the ICJ emphasized that, in
view of the Preah Vihear Temple's special religious and cultural
significance for people on both sides of the boundary, as well as for the
broader international community, the parties must exercise their
territorial rights in this boundary area with good faith and
cooperation.18 9 These cases demonstrate how boundary dispute
resolution can be influenced by both internal (the right to self-
determination of domestic groups) and external (the interest that all
people have in cultural heritage sites) challenges to the principle of
state sovereignty.
186. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the
Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2013) (arguing
that governments have other regarding obligations when shaping their domestic
policies); TEITEL, supra note 143, at 8 (calling for the "incorporation of humanitarian
concerns as a crucial element in the justification of state action").
187. See, e.g., Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the
Sanctity of Borders, 26 SAIS REV. INT'L AFF. 11, 16 (2006).
188. See, e.g., NICK VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, BORDER POLITICS: THE LIMITS OF
SOVEREIGN POWER (2009); Alan Hudson, Beyond the Borders: Globalisation, Sovereignty
and Extra-Territoriality, 3 GEOPOLITICS 89 (1998).
189. See supra Part III.C.
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V. TOWARDS A HUMAN-ORIENTED BOUNDARY DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The upshot of the forgoing discussion is that the recent inclination
of international adjudicators to take into account considerations other
than stability and continuity when they settle boundary disputes
marks a positive development in international law. This Part draws on
the emerging boundary jurisprudence, as well as on CBS insights, to
map out the main considerations that should arguably play a role in
the future adjudication of boundary disputes. Of course, not all
considerations would be relevant to all boundary disputes. Whether
they should be taken into account and how exactly they should be
reflected in the final delineation would depend on the particular
circumstances of each case.
As demonstrated here, the different considerations stand in
complex relation to each other (as well as to the principle of boundary
stability). In some situations, they may overlap or serve related
purposes, in others they may conflict. For purposes of convenience, the
considerations are classified here according to the actors who are likely
to have the greatest stake in border delineation, namely, local
borderland populations, the larger constituencies of the parties to the
boundary dispute, and the international community. After elaborating
on the interests and needs of each of these groups in Section A, Section
B will discuss the possible ways to incorporate them into boundary
adjudication and to balance them against the principle of stability,
while addressing some of the difficulties that such an endeavor may
involve.
A. The Relevant Considerations
1. Impact on Local Populations
One type of consideration that international adjudicators should
take into account when resolving boundary disputes concerns the
possible impact of alternative choices on the populations that live along
the boundary. The impact may have to do, for example, with the ability
of these populations to preserve their traditional modes of living.
Nomadic populations deserve special attention in this regard. As the
Burkina Faso/Niger case demonstrates, international boundaries may
bisect the customary routes of nomadic populations and thus disrupt
age-old pastoral systems.19 0 In the absence of alternative sources of
livelihood, this poses a serious threat to the subsistence needs of the
relevant populations. In addition, it undermines their ability to
preserve their ancestral cultures.
Similar concerns may arise when the boundary separates non-
nomadic populations from their agricultural lands or from water
resources on which they rely for irrigation or drinking. Legal
190. See supra Part III.B.
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researcher Gbenga Oduntan refers to these concerns as part of what
he calls "the problem of straddling villages," that is, the problem of
"organic human settlement[s], the physical appurtenances (houses,
dwellings, farms, cultivated fields, designated grazing areas, etc.) of
which overlap the territory of two or more sovereign States."1 91 He
notes that the splitting of villages by international boundaries may
limit the access of their inhabitants not only to their means of
subsistence, but also to other essential services and to their families
and friends. Criticizing the ICJ for refusing to take these adverse
effects into account when adjudicating boundary disputes,192 Oduntan
asserts that "the most desirable option is, as a matter of principle, to
always leave the entire communities within a single State."9 3
While this observation seems to be tenable, it raises the difficult
question of what the criteria should be for deciding where, that is, on
which side of the border, the village should remain. Arguably, the right
to internal self-determination-understood as the right of all groups
within a state to effectively participate in political decision
making'94-should play a crucial role here. This means that, all other
things being equal, if the prospects of a certain community to enjoy
equal political rights in one country seem to be higher than in the
other, it should stay with the country with more political rights. In fact,
in some cases, the need to secure the right of people to internal self-
determination may provide an independent justification for modifying
an uti possidetis or treaty-based boundary line: even if the boundary
line does not split a certain village, leaving it on the "wrong side" of the
boundary can be just as harmful.
This does not mean that boundary delineation should always be
designed to enhance ethnic, religious, national, or linguistic
homogeneity within countries. As noted by Steven Ratner, such an
aspiration would be incompatible with the "cosmopolitan tenets on
which all human rights law is based," and it may also have serious
destabilizing effects.'9 5 However, in cases where political reality
suggests that the ideal of a multicultural democracy that respects
minority rights is unlikely to be realized, where the international
191. Oduntan, Straddling Villages, supra note 170, at 86.
192. Id. Oduntan focuses on the case concerning the Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, in which the court asserted that even if the
historical boundary line divided certain communities, it did not have the power to modify
this line. The court added that it was "up to the parties to find a solution to any resultant
problems, with a view to respecting the rights and interests of the local population." See
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq.
Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303 11 107, 123 (Oct. 10).
193. Oduntan, Straddling Villages, supra note 170, at 82.
194. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A
New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 747-52 (1995); Jean Salmon, Internal
Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle?
in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 253 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
195. Ratner, supra note 6, at 592.
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boundaries of a state are already disputed, and where the necessary
adjustments are relatively small, some deviation from historical
boundaries may be justified in order to ensure the personal security
and human rights of vulnerable groups.
In any event, the determination of the needs and interests of local
populations should take into account their own preferences and
perspectives. Ultimately, the preferences of affected populations
should be ascertained through their direct participation in the
adjudicatory process. When direct participation is not an option (e.g.,
when the dispute is brought before the ICJ),19 6 the court or arbitration
tribunal should attempt to ensure that governments adequately
represent he perspectives of affected populations. As noted above, this
is precisely what Judge Cangado Trindade did in the Burkina
Faso/Niger case when he presented specific questions to the parties
regarding the possible effects of the boundary on nomadic populations
and received detailed answers supported by various documents.1 97
Another, less preferable option is to request that the parties hold
consultations with affected populations in the aftermath of the
adjudicatory process. In Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria, the parties established a mixed commission to
promote the implementation of the ICJ's judgment.198 This commission
created a sub-commission on the rights of affected populations that
"conducted several field trips to most of the villages and communities
along the land boundary in order to ascertain their views and to
anticipate the challenges that they would face as a result of the
delimitation and demarcation."'99 This consultation process, however,
was not mandated by the court, and the recommendations of the sub-
commission were only partially adopted by the parties.200
2. Impact on Inter-State Relations
As noted above, the main goal of traditional boundary dispute
settlement is to promote inter-state stability and reduce the causes of
conflict between neighboring states.201 Although under contemporary
global conditions there seems to be no justification for continuing to
196. The ICJ Statute provides that only states may be parties in cases before the
court. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, art. 35, (June 1945).
At the same time, the ICJ's rules of procedure do not afford any right to submit amicus
briefs. See Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Does. No. 5, reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L.
748 (1979). While individual persons may appear before the ICJ as witnesses or experts,
id., arts. 57 and 63, it is quite unlikely that the representatives of effected local
populations would be accorded such a role in boundary dispute cases.
197. Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 LC. 97, ¶f 63-69 (Trindade, J. concurring)
198. See Oduntan, Straddling Villages, supra note 170, at 81.
199. Id. at 90.
200. On the limitations of considering affected interests at the post-adjudicatory
phase, see infra Part V.B.
201. See supra Part II.
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assign this consideration exclusive weight,2 02 it nonetheless remains
an important goal of the international legal system. Yet, it should be
stressed that adherence to historical boundaries is not the only way-
nor necessarily the most effective way-to promote peaceful relations
between neighboring states in the context of boundary dispute
settlement.20 3 Another way is to delineate boundaries in a manner that
encourages ongoing cooperation between the parties. This may require
international judges and arbitrators to devise creative strategies and
generate tailor-made solutions, but experience suggests that such an
effort may be worthwhile.204
A possible strategy for enhancing cross-border cooperation is to
create a special transboundary zone, to be jointly administered by the
parties, instead of strictly dividing that zone between the border
countries. This solution may be particularly appropriate when the area
concerned has a special environmental value, for example, due to rich
biodiversity or because it contains an important water resource.
Instead of being a source of ongoing tension, such conditions can create
an opportunity for peacebuilding through the creation of
transboundary natural conservation zones. Successful models of jointly
administered border zones include the Emerald Triangle protected
area between Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, the W National Park that
overlaps with Niger, Benin, and Burkina Faso, and dozens of other
"peace parks" around the world.2 05
Establishing a jointly controlled transboundary zone can also be
an appropriate solution when the disputed zone has special cultural,
economic, or strategic importance for both parties. A remarkable
example can be found in the case concerning Brako. In the 1995 Dayton
peace negotiations, it was decided that Bosnia and Herzegovina would
become a federal state comprised of two entities: the predominantly
Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) and the
predominantly Serb Republika Srpska (RS).206 After an intensive
exchange of maps, the parties managed to consensually delineate most
of the boundary between the two entities. 207 However, one small area
in the northeastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina-the Briko area-
202. See supra Part IV.C.
203. The claim that the principle of stability of boundaries did not always promote
peaceful relations between neighboring states was made already by early critiques of
this principle. See, e.g., CUKWURAH, supra note 2, at 114 (noting that the doctrine of uti
possidetis failed to prevent or terminate many boundary disputes in Latin America).
204. See, e.g., infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., PEACE PARKS: CONSERVATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Saleem
H. Ali ed., 2007).
206. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Annex 4, art. 1(3) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement].
207. Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brako,
(Federation of Bosn. & Herz. v. The Republika Srpska), Final Award, 38 I.L.M 536, 537
(1999) [hereinafter Brako Final Award].
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remained contested.208 The Bosniaks claimed strong historical ties to
Br6ko and considered it the main connection of the FBH to European
markets, while the Serbs refused to give up the only territorial link
between the two parts of the RS.20 9 To overcome the deadlock, the
parties decided to submit the matter to a three-member arbitration
tribunal that would rule on the disputed portion of the inter-entity
boundary line on the basis of legal and equitable principles.2 10 After it
had heard both parties, the arbitration tribunal refused to allocate
Brdko to either of them. Instead, it decided to establish a new
administrative unit, the Br6ko District, which would enjoy autonomous
status within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and would be
held "in condominium" by the FBH and the RS under international
supervision.2 11 Although this decision has been criticized on various
grounds,212 few would deny its success in bringing stability to an
extremely volatile territory.2 13
3. Impact on the International Community
In the Brtko case, the arbitration tribunal noted that one of the
considerations it took into account was the international
community.2 14 It 'explained that the international community had a
fundamental interest in promoting stability in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which could be inferred from the immense financial,
military, and diplomatic resources that it invested in this area.215 It
added that, "while the arbitrators' mandate derives from an agreement
signed by the parties, the Tribunal's work is of broad international
interest and concern."2 16 It also noted that "the international
community's most urgent objective is to maximize the freedom of
refugees and displaced persons to return to their original homes in
208. Id.
209. Bart L. Smit Duijzentkunst & Sophia L.R. Dawkins, Arbitrary Peace?
Consent Management in International Arbitration, 26 EUR. J. INT'L L. 139, 147 (2015).
210. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 206, Annex 2, art. V(3).
211. See Brako Final Award, supra note 207, at 535. The final award was preceded
by a preliminary and a supplemental award that created an interim autonomous regime
in the Brako District. See Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in
Brdko Area, Arbitration for the Brako Area (Republika Srpska v. Federation of Bosn.&
Herz.), UN Doc. S/1997/126, 14 Feb. 1997, 36 I.L.M. 396 (1997) [hereinafter Broko
Preliminary Award]; Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brtko
Area, Arbitration for the Brako Area (Republika Srpska v. Federation of Bosn. & Herz.),
Supplemental Award, UN Doc. S/1998/248, 15 March 1998.
212. See, e.g., Peter C. Farrand, Lessons from Brjko: Necessary Components for
Future Internationally Supervised Territories, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 529 (2001);
Christoph Schreuer, The Brdko Final Award of 5 March 1999, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 575,
579-81 (1999).
213. See Duijzentkunst & Dawkins, supra note 209, at 152 (noting that "as of
January 2015 there had been no open violence in Brako for almost two decades").
214. Brako Final Award, supra note 207, at 539, 546.
215. Brako Preliminary Award, supra note 211, 1 94.
216. Id. at ¶ 100.
150 [VOL. 50:.113
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF BOUNDARY DISPUTE
BIH" and that, in the area of Brako, this objective would best be served
by keeping the area out of the exclusive control of either of the two
entities.2 17 As noted above, the interests of the international
community were also invoked in Temple of Preah Vihear (Request for
Interpretation), where the court emphasized the unique status of the
temple as a World Heritage Site and mentioned the responsibility of
the parties to cooperate with the international community in
protecting it. 2 18
These cases demonstrate that bilateral boundary disputes can
implicate wider international interests, which range from the general
interest that the international community has in the peaceful
resolution of conflicts around the world and the promotion of
international peace and security, to more specific interests connected
with a particular boundary zone and the natural or historical assets
located within it. Third countries may also have an interest in the
influence of delineation judgments and awards on the development of
international boundary law. Even if it does not create a formally
binding precedent, the decision of an international tribunal in a
particular boundary dispute can influence future judicial and policy
choices relating to other boundaries.219 These realities suggest that
judges and arbitrators adjudicating boundary disputes (or indeed, any
other type of international dispute) may reasonably be expected to
contemplate the possible implications of their decisions on actors other
than the parties and their constituencies.
B. How to Balance between the Conflicting Considerations
It is worth stressing again at this point that the principle of
stability of boundaries, despite its obvious pitfalls, currently
represents the best available guiding principle for adjudicating
boundary disputes. In the absence of a realistic alternative to a world
order based on territorial nation-states, and given the political
impossibility of redistributing the world territory among states on an
equal basis, existing state boundaries, arbitrary as they may be, should
generally be accepted and respected. This approach represents the
logic of formal legality: the consequences of a forceful or whimsical
allocation, occupation, annexation, or transfer of territory should be
generally treated as valid if this act was permissible at the time that it
took place.
That said, the general, or guiding principle of boundary stability
should not be treated-as it was until recently-as a decisive one.
217. Br6ko Final Award, supra note 207, at 546.
218. See supra Part III.C
219. On the lawmaking role of international tribunals, see for example Nienke
Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 61,
68-71 (2013); Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International
Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L.J. 979 (2011).
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Instead, it should be subject to exceptions and limitations dictated by
the fundamental interests of those affected. Adjudicators should be
aware of the destabilizing potential of reopening historical boundaries,
but this risk should not prevent them from modifying historical
boundaries in appropriate cases. As noted above, ignoring the economic
needs or ethnic affiliations of local populations may also have a
destabilizing effect, and in any event, stability and peace do not
represent all that is important in contemporary international law.
While it is hard to provide a generally applicable formula for balancing
between such interests and the principle of boundary stability, it seems
clear that the smaller the deviation from historical boundaries and the
more essential the interests that it serves, the easier it would be to
justify it, and vice versa.
In any event, the question arises: Once an international tribunal
has decided that, in the case before it, there is a justification for
departing from the historical boundary in order to protect some other
interests, how exactly should this departure be constructed and
explained? There are three main options here: The first is to explicitly
depart from the historical boundary and state the reasons for doing so.
The second is to use the human-oriented interests as an interpretive
tool that allegedly helps the tribunal determine the location of the
historical boundary. The third is to refrain from assigning actual
weight to any consideration other than boundary stability within the
judgment or award, but encourage the parties to take such
considerations into account in the post-adjudicatory demarcation
phase (i.e., the phase of marking the boundary lines on the ground).
The first option is the most straightforward. It suggests that, if
the tribunal finds it appropriate to deviate from the historical
boundary, it should explicitly say and do so. This approach, however,
may be problematic when the judicial or arbitral tribunal derives its
authority from a special agreement between the parties and that
agreement provides that the dispute should be resolved in accordance
with the principle of the stability and continuity of boundaries.220 In
such cases, explicit departure from the historical boundaries may
expose the tribunal to the accusation that it has exceeded its mandate.
Depending on the circumstances of a given case and on the terms of the
relevant agreement, a possible counterargument may be that interests
that are protected by customary international law or by multilateral
treaties to which the parties are members can be read into the special
agreement between them and may present implicit exceptions to the
principle of stability adopted therein.221 This may be relevant, for
220. Such agreements were concluded, for example, in Burk. FasolMali, 1986
I.C.J. at 557, and in Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. at 50. In both cases, the preamble to
the special agreement provided that the parties desired to resolve their dispute in
accordance with the principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization.
221. See, e.g., Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 97, I¶46-47 (Trindade, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the parties are bound by treaty obligations to ensure the
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example, when the interests at stake have to do with the preservation
of indigenous lifestyles or with the protection of natural resources or
cultural heritage sites. Such an argument, however, may involve
complicated doctrinal questions regarding the relationship between
general and specific and earlier and later international legal norms, as
well as other questions concerning normative hierarchies in
international law.222
To avoid these complexities, the tribunal may prefer to refrain
from explicitly admitting a departure from historical boundaries and
instead pursue the second option of incorporating human-oriented
considerations into its judgment or award through interpretive
manipulations. As illustrated above, this strategy was implemented in
the Abyei case, where the arbitration tribunal upheld the tribal
interpretation of the British boundary delineation formula, while
noting that this interpretation promoted self-determination and
supported peace efforts.223 This strategy was also used in the Burkina
Faso/Niger case, where the court asserted that the 1927 French Arrt6
placed the boundary within the Sirba River, while noting that this
interpretation ensures access to the river's waters for people on both
sides.224 The main pitfall of relying on such interpretive methods,
however, is that introducing human-oriented considerations through
the "back door" may undermine legal certainty in the context of
boundary adjudication. This, in turn, may deter states from submitting
their boundary disputes to international tribunals, which may
eventually lead to the resolution of some boundary disputes through
the use of force.
freedom of movement of nomadic populations). See supra note 181 and accompanying
text.
222. One limitation on the ability of states to conclude a special agreement hat
conflicts with a customary norm or with a multilateral treaty applies when the latter
embeds a peremptory norm of general international law, that is, "a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted." See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331. However, the question which norms exactly have the status
of peremptory norms is a contested one. Another limitation can be found in id. art. 41,
which applies certain conditions to the ability of two or more of the parties to a (non-
peremptory) multilateral treaty to modify that treaty as between themselves alone,
including the condition that the modification in question, if not provided for under the
treaty, "does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the
effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole." This condition
seems to preclude any bilateral modification of 'absolute' (as opposed to reciprocal)
multilateral treaties, including human rights and environmental treaties. See THE
VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1004 (Olivier Corten &
Pierre Klein eds., 2011). It is not clear, however, whether and under which circumstances
an agreement to settle a boundary dispute in accordance with the principle of the
stability and continuity of boundaries could be considered to modify a multilateral
human rights or environmental convention.
223. See supra Part III.A.
224. See supra Part IJI.B.
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The third option, namely, to call upon the parties to take human-
oriented considerations into account in the demarcation phase,
significantly simplifies the work of the tribunal. It was employed, for
example, in the Burkina Faso/Niger case, where the court called upon
the parties to exercise their territorial rights with due regard to the
needs of nomadic populations.225 However, since this approach allows
considerable discretion to the parties, it runs the risk of leaving
essential interests without adequate protection. Whether the parties
would follow the tribunal's recommendations obviously depends on
many factors, including the nature of the relationship between the
parties (hostile relations might jeopardize effective cooperation in
protecting affected interests)226 and the relative power of the affected
interests (vulnerable or diffuse interests are generally less likely to be
protected). It seems, however, that, by emphasizing the importance of
protecting certain interests and by providing detailed guidelines to the
parties, judges and arbitrators can increase the chances that their
recommendations will be followed.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes CBS as a new theoretical framework for
analyzing international boundary dispute adjudication. This
framework sheds light on the power dynamics that underpin inter-
state boundary delineation, and points to the need to mitigate their
effects. The Article notes that international tribunals have made an
important step in this direction in some recent decisions and suggests
ways to further develop international boundary adjudication along this
path. In so doing, the Article seeks to contribute to promoting justice
in the field of boundary dispute settlement and to increase its relevance
to contemporary international law and politics. At the same time, the
Article demonstrates the potential of marrying international law
analysis with critical geography literature, which has, so far, mostly
been overlooked by lawyers and geographers alike.
225. See Burk. Faso/Niger, 2013 I.C.J. 44; see also supra note 179 and
accompanying text.
226. See Oduntan, Straddling Villages, supra note 170, at 99.
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